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Abstract
In July 2013, a new Australian Government–funded labour market 
program was implemented across remote Australia: the Remote Jobs and 
Communities Program (RJCP). The program (now renamed and restructured 
as the Community Development Programme – CDP) had a case load of 
around 36 000 people, of whom about 85% were Indigenous. Most people 
in the program were required to participate in activities as a condition of 
receiving income support and were subject to the Job Seeker Compliance 
Framework, which sets out financial penalties and safeguards for those who 
fail to comply. This paper examines penalties applied to participants in RJCP 
during the two years from 1 July 2013 and compares them with penalties 
applied under the general equivalent program, Job Services Australia. 
We find that penalties were applied to RJCP jobseekers at a much higher 
rate, and that this was particularly the case for penalties associated with 
mandatory Work for the Dole–type activities and ‘persistent noncompliance’. 
The difference appears to arise from (1) more onerous program requirements 
in RJCP, (2) ineffectiveness of protections for remote jobseekers, and 
(3) different individual and local responses to program requirements and 
penalties. We end by noting the recent reform of RJCP into CDP and the 
likely impact on future application of financial penalties. 
Keywords: income support, employment, participation requirements, 
compliance
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Introduction
I n July 2013, a new Australian Government–funded labour market program was implemented across 
remote Australia: the Remote Jobs and Communities 
Program (RJCP). According to the then Labor 
government, the new program was designed to 
accommodate the specific circumstances of remote 
communities, particularly Indigenous people, who 
were anticipated to represent around 85% of its client 
base. The Coalition government, elected in September 
2013, moved administrative responsibility for RJCP to 
the Australian Government Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), and began putting its 
own stamp it. During the two years from the beginning of 
the program to July 2015, the rate of penalties applied to 
RJCP jobseekers grew substantially, both in raw numbers 
and as a percentage of all penalties applied to all 
jobseekers. During this period, more than 47 000 financial 
penalties were applied to a case load of around 
37 000 people. More than 6700 of these penalties fell into 
the category of ‘serious failures’, attracting a penalty of 
up to eight weeks without income support. 
This paper sets out the available public data on these 
trends and suggests some likely causes. Towards its 
conclusion, it points to the likely additional impact of 
the most recent set of reforms to the program, which 
took effect on 1 July 2015. These included renaming the 
program the Community Development Programme (CDP).
Background
Under social security legislation, unemployed recipients 
of income support (known officially as jobseekers) 
have ‘participation requirements’. This means that they 
are required to actively seek work and to participate 
in activities as a condition of receipt of benefits.1 At 
26 June 2015, there were 36 803 jobseekers in RJCP, 
of whom around 83% identified as Indigenous.2 They 
represented around 4–5% of the total case load across 
all employment programs nationally, and around 28% of 
the Indigenous-identified case load across employment 
programs.3 Until 1 July 2015, the largest nonremote 
employment program was Job Services Australia (JSA) – 
now replaced by jobactive. In December 2013, JSA had 
a case load of 760 000, of whom around 9% identified 
as Indigenous (Forrest 2014:146). Within JSA, jobseekers 
were allocated to one of four service streams, based 
on length of unemployment and level of disadvantage. 
Around 69% of Indigenous people were in streams 3 
or 4, reflecting a higher level of assessed disadvantage 
and/or longer-term unemployment (Forrest 2014:146). In 
nonremote areas, the other large employment program 
was Disability Employment Services – with about 
153 000 jobseekers at December 2013, of whom around 
5% identified as Indigenous (Forrest 2014:150). People 
with equivalent levels of assessed disability in remote 
areas were referred to RJCP. 
In recent evidence given to the Senate, DPM&C, which is 
responsible for RJCP, noted that:
• 95% of the most disadvantaged locations of the 
country according to the SEIFA (Socio-Economic 
Indexes for Areas) Index fall within the remote area of 
Australia serviced by RJCP (now CDP)
• around one-quarter of the 60 RJCP service regions 
had employment rates of less than 30% at the 
2011 Census (see Fig. A1).4
More broadly, Indigenous people, including those living 
in remote Australia, experience higher rates of disability, 
chronic health conditions and mental illness, and have 
more limited access to relevant services (AIHW 2015). 
The Job Seeker Compliance Framework sets out a 
series of penalties that may be applied to jobseekers 
when they fail to comply with participation requirements. 
The most common penalties arise from failure to attend 
rescheduled appointments with employment service 
providers (reconnection penalties5) and No Show No 
Pay penalties incurred when a jobseeker fails to attend 
an activity (e.g. training or Work for the Dole) set out in 
an individual plan. Penalties for serious failures – which 
can mean up to eight weeks loss of income support 
– are applied when a jobseeker refuses suitable work 
or has incurred frequent minor penalties (see the next 
section). The Australian Government Department of 
Employment publishes information on a quarterly basis 
about financial penalties applied to income support 
recipients under social security legislation (DoE, various 
dates). This includes information about the number of 
penalties applied to people in particular employment 
programs, although not total numbers of jobseekers by 
program. Examination of these data over the two years 
from the start of RJCP on 1 July 2013 suggests that the 
developing pattern of financial penalties in RJCP was 
significantly different from that in its major nonremote 
equivalent, JSA.6
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Penalties applied to RJCP participants 
compared with JSA participants
From 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2015, JSA accounted for 
most jobseeker financial penalties applied under social 
security legislation, as shown in Fig. 1. During this two-
year period, financial penalties under JSA reached a 
peak in the quarter ending September 2014 and then 
halved during the remainder of the 2014–15 financial year. 
In contrast, under RJCP, there was an initial drop in the 
number of penalties applied after September 2014, but 
the number rose again in 2015. In the final quarter to the 
end of June 2015, 22% of all financial penalties were 
applied to RJCP participants, more than four times their 
representation in the total jobseeker case load. 
The principal explanation for the decline in overall 
penalties under JSA after September 2014 appears to 
have been a change in the process used to re-engage 
jobseekers after they failed to attend an appointment 
with their employment service provider. From September 
2014, when jobseekers missed their regular appointment 
with their employment service provider, instead of 
contacting the Australian Government Department of 
Human Services (DHS)7 to arrange a ‘reconnection 
appointment’ (and to reinstate income support), they 
contacted the provider directly. This drove a large 
decline in reconnection penalties (i.e. those incurred 
for nonattendance at a reconnection appointment), as 
shown in Fig. 2. From the first to the fourth quarter of the 
2014–15 financial year, these penalties declined by 72% 
in JSA and by 66% in RJCP. The impact of this change 
on total financial penalties applied under RJCP was much 
less than under JSA because reconnection penalties 
represented a significantly smaller proportion of total 
financial penalties applied under RJCP (Table 1).
TABLE 1. Composition of penalties applied in 
JSA and RJCP, July 2013 to June 2015 
Type of penalty JSA (%) RJCP (%)
Reconnection penalties 43.4 25.9
No Show No Pay (activity-
related) penalties 42.4 59.7
Serious failures (all) 12.6 14.2
Other financial penalties 1.6 0.2
Total 100.0 100.0
JSA = Job Services Australia; RJCP = Remote Jobs and Communities 
Program
For RJCP jobseekers, the decline in reconnection 
penalties over the year to June 2015 was more than offset 
by a substantial rise in the largest category of RJCP 
penalty: No Show No Pay (activity-related) penalties 
(Fig. 3).8 These penalties were applied when a jobseeker 
did not attend an activity – for example, a Work for the 
Dole project or training session – that was included in 
their individual plan (or Employment Pathway Plan – 
EPP9) without a ‘reasonable excuse’.10 No Show No Pay 
failures attracted a penalty of one-tenth of an individual’s 
fortnightly income support payment for each day of 
nonattendance. 
FIG. 1.  Jobseeker penalties by employment program
0
20 000
40 000
60 000
80 000
100 000
Not in employment 
services
DES
JSA stream 4
JSA stream 3
JSA stream 2
JSA stream 1
RJCP
Jun 2015Mar 2015Dec 2014Sep 2014Jun 2014Mar 2014Dec 2013Sept 2013
N
um
be
r o
f p
en
al
tie
s
DES = Disability Employment Services; JSA = Job Services Australia; RJCP = Remote Jobs and Communities Program
caepr.anu.edu.au
Working Paper No. 108/2016  3 
Fig. 3 shows the numbers of RJCP and JSA clients who 
received a No Show No Pay penalty over the two years 
to 30 June 2015. There was a noticeable drop in these 
penalties in JSA in the final quarter (to the end of June 
2015), which is likely to have been the result of reduced 
compliance activity as jobseekers and providers moved 
across to the new jobactive program.11 However, even 
if this June 2015 quarter is excluded from analysis, 
there was a marked difference in the trends across the 
two programs. During the full year to March 2015, No 
Show No Pay penalties increased fivefold in RJCP while 
remaining steady in JSA. During the full year to the end of 
June 2015, nearly 23 000 penalties were applied to RJCP 
jobseekers for not attending their activities. This category 
of penalty accounted for 60% of all penalties applied in 
RJCP during the two years (Table 1), rising to 76% in the 
June 2015 quarter. 
FIG. 2 .  Reconnection penalties under JSA and RJCP
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FIG. 3 .  No Show No Pay penalties (failure to attend activities)
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The third major category of financial penalty applied 
to RJCP participants was that arising from serious 
failures. There are two types of serious failures: those 
that are work related, including refusing a suitable job 
and misconduct leading to loss of employment; and 
those that relate to ‘persistent noncompliance’ with 
program requirements. DHS considers applying a serious 
failure penalty for persistent noncompliance when a 
jobseeker has incurred three other financial penalties 
(e.g. reconnection or No Show No Pay penalties) within 
a six-month period. If these lower-level penalties are 
applied to a group at a higher rate, this eventually flows 
into a higher rate of persistent noncompliance penalties 
for that group. Serious failures incur a penalty of eight 
weeks without income support, although this may be 
‘worked off’.12 
Fig. 4 shows that the rate of work-related serious 
penalties applied to both RJCP and JSA jobseekers 
remained fairly steady during the two years under 
consideration. However, there was an increase in the 
number of penalties for persistent noncompliance 
applied to RJCP jobseekers, coinciding with a marked 
decrease in these penalties applied to those in JSA. In 
the June 2015 quarter, 36% of all penalties for persistent 
noncompliance with program requirements were applied 
to RJCP jobseekers – more than seven times their 
representation in the overall case load. 
Fig. 5 shows the number of penalties applied to RJCP 
jobseekers, expressed as a proportion of all jobseeker 
penalties. While the Department of Employment does 
not provide quarterly information about how many 
individuals are in each program alongside how many of 
them have been penalised, we can determine from other 
sources that, at most, RJCP jobseekers comprise 5% 
of jobseekers who may be subject to a financial penalty. 
On this basis, they could be expected to receive around 
5% of all penalties applied. However, Fig. 5 shows that, 
during the two years, RJCP jobseekers have become 
substantially overrepresented across all but one of 
the major categories of penalties. For example, RJCP 
jobseekers accounted for 29% of activity-related No 
Show No Pay penalties applied in the June 2015 quarter 
and 36% of all penalties for persistent noncompliance 
in that quarter. The one area in which RJCP jobseekers 
were underrepresented was the category that related to 
job refusal or ‘voluntary unemployment’.
FIG. 4 .  Serious penalties applied under RJCP and JSA 
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FIG. 5 .  Proportion of financial penalties applied to jobseekers in RJCP (various categories)
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What is going on?
During this two-year period, the pattern and rate of 
penalties applied to jobseekers under RJCP differed 
substantially from those applied under JSA, even 
though the same social security rules – the Job Seeker 
Compliance Framework – applied to both. Three likely 
contributing factors to this variation are identified and 
discussed here: 
• more onerous program requirements for RJCP
• ineffectiveness of protections for remote jobseekers
• different individual and local responses to program 
requirements and penalties.
More onerous program requirements for RJCP
Job plans, or EPPs, set out what each individual must do 
to receive income support payments. The power to make 
these agreements has been delegated to contracted 
employment service providers, including JSA and RJCP 
providers (DSS 2015). However, the content of these 
plans – in particular, the level of program participation 
that is required of jobseekers – is largely prescribed by 
program rules that are included in employment service 
contracts and government-issued guidelines. 
The program rules for RJCP providers from July 2013 
specified that agreements with jobseekers had to include 
monthly appointments and could include job search, 
where labour market opportunities were available. In 
addition, the rules stated that:
Under RJCP, job seekers must participate in activities 
on an ongoing basis (eg each fortnight). As a guide, 
the level of fortnightly participation that is typically 
expected of job seekers is as follows:
• full time activity tested job seekers: activities of around 
40 hours per fortnight (and, as appropriate, job search)
• principal carer parents: activities of around 20 hours per 
fortnight (and, as appropriate, job search)
• job seekers with a partial capacity of at least 15 hours 
per week to work or temporary reduced work capacity 
of at least 15 hours per week: activities of around 
20 hours per fortnight or to their capacity (and, as 
appropriate, job search). (DEEWR 2013:4) [emphasis in 
original].
This is a more onerous activity requirement than that 
placed on JSA clients in similar circumstances (see 
Table 2).13 In particular, while most RJCP jobseekers were 
required to participate in some form of activity for around 
20 hours per week on a continuous basis from the time 
they started in the program, most JSA jobseekers were 
only required to participate in regular weekly activities 
after 12 months in the program, and then for up to 
15 hours per week for six months of the year.14 
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TABLE 2 . Mutual obligation requirements 
across programs
Category
JSA (2010 – 
June 2015)
RJCP (July 2013 – 
June 2015)
Appointment 
frequency
Generally monthly 
after initial period 
of self-directed job 
search; bimonthly 
during Work 
Experience stream
Monthly 
appointments
Activities After 12 months, 
or 18 months for 
stream 4, enter 
Work Experience 
stream, which could 
include training, 
voluntary work, 
‘group activities’ – 
such as Work for 
the Dole
After 2 years in 
program, can be 
required to do Work 
Experience activities 
for 11 months of the 
year, where provider 
considers this 
beneficial
Year-round activity 
requirements 
start from day 1 – 
typically 40 hours 
per fortnight, 
with a minimum 
of 30 hours per 
fortnight for those 
in structured 
(group) activities
21–39 years 
of age
Once in Work 
Experience stream, 
390 hours over 
26 weeks if group 
activity (about 
15 hours per week); 
less if in training, or 
voluntary or paid 
work
As above (around 
20 hours per week, 
year-round)
40–49 years 
of age
Once in Work 
Experience stream, 
150 hours over 
26 weeks (about 
11.5 hours per 
fortnight)
As above
Early school 
leavers who 
are 22 years 
of age or less
25 hours per week 25 hours per week
Principal 
carers or 
people with 
reduced 
capacity
Once in Work 
Experience stream, 
150 hours over 
26 weeks (about 
11.5 hours per 
fortnight)
20 hours per 
fortnight
JSA = Job Services Australia; RJCP = Remote Jobs and Communities 
Program
The requirement for RJCP jobseekers to attend activities 
more often, and from an earlier stage, than their 
counterparts in JSA might be expected to flow into a 
higher rate of application of penalties for nonattendance 
at activities, simply as a result of there being more 
opportunities in each week for them to ‘fail’. Fig. 5 shows 
that, by the end of the first year of RJCP (June 2014), the 
proportion of all activity-related penalties being applied 
to jobseekers under RJCP was significantly above their 
representation in the case load – that is, 9% of activity-
related penalties compared with only 4–5% of the case 
load. The rate of these penalties did not stabilise at this 
level, but continued to climb over the following year, with 
the greatest acceleration occurring in the first half of 
2015. During this period, although there was no major 
change to the RJCP rules, the election of a Coalition 
government in September 2013 was associated with 
an increased emphasis on ‘structured activities’ as the 
primary form of RJCP participation requirement, and 
this was reflected in increased monitoring and attention 
by contract managers. Structured activities (Work 
for the Dole) were distinguished from other activity 
options by the requirement for direct supervision of 
jobseekers, and recording and reporting daily attendance 
using timesheets, making it easier to track and report 
noncompliance. The sharpest increase in No Show No 
Pay penalties under RJCP followed an announcement by 
the Minister for Indigenous Affairs in December 2014 that, 
from 1 July 2015, activity requirements would increase to 
25 hours per week of Work for the Dole, spread over five 
days per week throughout the year, and that provider fees 
would be linked to daily attendance at these activities 
(Scullion 2014, DPM&C 2015a). After this announcement, 
in the six months leading up to the implementation of 
the new rules, 14 835 No Show No Pay penalties were 
applied under RJCP, compared with 8149 during the 
previous six months. 
The more onerous activity requirements from day 1 of 
RJCP under Labor laid a foundation for higher penalties. 
However, the policy signals of the Coalition minister 
and officials from DPM&C during 2014 appear also to 
have been important in driving provider behaviour. The 
combination has driven a substantially higher rate of 
No Show No Pay penalties and, in turn, a higher rate of 
penalties for persistent noncompliance under RJCP than 
that applied to other jobseekers, despite the application 
of a common legislative framework. 
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Ineffectiveness of protections 
for remote jobseekers
As income support payments have become more 
conditional upon meeting program obligations, 
governments have also (sometimes under pressure) 
put in place a series of protections for unemployed 
people who face losing their income support. Although 
negotiation, monitoring and reporting on individual 
jobseeker obligations are principally undertaken by 
contracted employment service providers, DHS makes 
final decisions about whether penalties should be 
applied. This department is responsible for administering 
processes that are meant to ensure that obligations are 
fair and reasonable, and that the withdrawal of income 
support does not cause undue harm to those affected. 
When providers report an apparent compliance failure (a 
participation report), DHS undertakes a series of checks 
before applying a penalty. For example, it must verify 
that the jobseeker was notified of, and understood, their 
obligations and that the obligations were reasonable. 
In the year to June 2015, RJCP providers submitted 
42 534 participation reports, of which 27% were rejected 
by DHS.15 Remote providers have often expressed 
frustration at this process, perceiving it to be overly 
bureaucratic, and arguing that the officers considering 
what excuses may be reasonable have little familiarity 
with the location, let alone the individual jobseekers 
(see, for example, Disney et al. 2010:72). Despite this, 
during the 2014–15 financial year, DHS was less likely to 
reject participation reports submitted by RJCP providers 
than other providers (27% rejection rate under RJCP, 
compared with 35% across employment services). 
Examination of recent information provided to Senate 
Estimates about reasons for participation reports being 
rejected suggests that around 30% of rejections were 
for administrative error (e.g. the activity was not properly 
reflected in the plan). In other cases, DHS found that the 
jobseeker did have a valid excuse for nonattendance – 
for example, a medical condition (11.5% of rejections), 
bereavement (6.1%) or caring responsibilities (4.1%), or 
that the activity requirement itself was unreasonable (10% 
of rejections).16
In addition to these general procedural protections, 
as participation requirements have extended to 
more categories of income support recipients with 
more challenging personal circumstances, additional 
protections have been introduced for people considered 
vulnerable (Disney et al. 2010:20). These measures rely 
on a series of formal assessments by DHS of the work 
capacity and personal circumstances of individuals. 
When people apply for income support, DHS administers 
a questionnaire that is designed to identify obstacles they 
might face to employment – the Job Seeker Classification 
Instrument. This may trigger referral for a professional 
assessment of work capacity – an Employment Services 
Assessment (ESAt) – which is designed to ensure that 
the employment and program expectations of individuals 
are reasonable, given their health issues, disabilities and 
circumstances.17 DHS may also attach a Vulnerability 
Indicator to the jobseeker’s record, alerting DHS and 
provider staff that the jobseeker’s circumstances may 
affect their ability to meet program obligations. Following 
the initial assessment, providers can also identify 
any other, or new, circumstances that might affect 
participation, again triggering referral for an ESAt. 
These systems are intended to ensure that the 
participation requirements for individuals are reasonable, 
particularly in cases where people have a disability 
(e.g. a cognitive impairment), have mental or other health 
problems, or are experiencing personal crises, such as 
homelessness or domestic violence. 
ESAts are designed to be conducted face to face by a 
health or allied health professional.18 However, in the 
period from 1 July 2015 to 31 October 2015, while 79% 
of all ESAts were conducted face to face (including via 
videoconference), only 35% of ESAts involving RJCP 
(now CDP) clients were conducted face to face or via 
videoconference.19 Of ESAts in relation to RJCP clients 
during this period, 17% were conducted solely by 
reviewing evidence held on file. Interpreters were used 
on only nine occasions (1.7% of ESAts conducted with 
RJCP clients), despite the high proportion of clients 
for whom English is not their first language.20 The 
effectiveness of assessments may also be affected by 
lack of access to professional and community services in 
remote areas (Disney et al. 2010:75). DHS assessors rely 
heavily on evidence provided by health and other treating 
professionals, particularly where assessments are not 
face to face. Problems for jobseekers in accessing 
these services mean that participation barriers faced by 
remote Indigenous people may not be properly identified 
or documented. The Department of Employment itself 
identified these issues in a 2012 report, in which it 
attributed substantial underrepresentation of remote 
Indigenous people in stream 4 of JSA (the stream 
reserved for the most disadvantaged clients) to failure 
to interview face to face and to lack of nonvocational 
services in remote areas (DEEWR 2012:31–33). 
A further protection in the Job Seeker Compliance 
Framework operates before application of a serious 
penalty for persistent noncompliance. Before this penalty 
is applied, a specialist DHS officer (generally a social 
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worker) must conduct a Comprehensive Compliance 
Assessment (CCA). The CCA is designed to examine the 
reasons for noncompliance, including any underlying 
personal or health issues affecting the individual. Where 
DHS finds that a jobseeker has persistently failed to 
comply, and has done so ‘intentionally, recklessly or 
negligently’, an eight-week penalty can be applied. 
Alternatively, DHS may: 
• refer the jobseeker for an ESAt
• change the jobseeker’s service stream (JSA only)
• make another decision – for example, alter the EPP 
or refer to alternative assistance services (called an 
‘other outcome’)
• make a finding that the conditions for finding 
persistent noncompliance are not there (‘no 
outcome’).21 
Table 3 shows that, where RJCP clients were referred 
for CCAs during the 2014–15 financial year, DHS was 
significantly more likely to make a finding of persistent 
noncompliance than for other jobseekers (65.5% for 
those in RJCP versus 44.7% for all jobseekers). DHS 
was much less likely to refer RJCP jobseekers than 
other jobseekers to other forms of assistance or support 
(25.5% versus 38.5%). 
Given the prevalence in remote communities of factors 
that are likely to lead to noncompliance – such as mental 
illness, substance abuse and personal violence – it 
is surprising that DHS is more likely to consider that 
remote clients’ actions were not affected by these types 
of issues, and less likely to refer them to alternative 
assistance. As with ESAts, the means of assessment 
may be important. Table 4 shows that CCAs were almost 
never conducted face to face for RJCP clients (1.1%). 
Again, we suggest that failure to properly identify and 
document underlying issues is a significant contributor to 
worse outcomes for RJCP jobseekers through CCAs.
TABLE 3 . Outcome of Comprehensive Compliance Assessments, 2014–15
Outcome
RJCP All (includes RJCP)
Number % Number %
Referral for ESAt naa naa 2 586 6.9
Stream changedb 0 0.0 329 0.9
Other outcome 1 587 25.5 14 391 38.5
No outcome 515 8.3 3 339 8.9
Persistent noncompliance 4 073 65.5 16 713 44.7
Total 6 215 100.0 37 358 100.0
ESAt = Employment Services Assessment; na = not available; RJCP = Remote Jobs and Communities Program 
a No data available because the number in each quarter was less than 20.
b RJCP does not have service streams.
Source:  Department of Employment, quarterly jobseeker compliance data, 2014, 2015
TABLE 4 . Delivery method for Comprehensive Compliance Assessments, 2014–15
CCA delivery method
Other programs RJCP Total
Number % Number % Number %
Face-to-face interview 3 902 12.8 65 1.1 3 967 10.8
Phone interview 26 530 87.2 6 107 98.9 32 637 89.2
Total 30 432 100.0 6 172 100.0 36 604 100.0
CCA = Comprehensive Compliance Assessment; RJCP = Remote Jobs and Communities Program 
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In 2010, one year after the introduction of most of 
the elements of the current Job Seeker Compliance 
Framework, an independent review was conducted of 
its efficacy. The review panel expressed concern over 
the operation of protections in the framework in remote 
areas: 
The new compliance system faces great difficulties 
in remote areas, especially in relation to Indigenous 
people. While some of its innovative safeguards are 
preventing hardship which might otherwise have 
occurred, there is a clear risk that Participation 
Reports and participation failures will continue to 
accumulate for reasons which have more to do with 
the dearth of opportunities and services in these 
areas than with recalcitrance on the part of job 
seekers. (Disney et al. 2010:75)
Further, the review panel argued that:
It is clear that shortages of non-vocational services 
are greatly weakening the efficacy and fairness 
of the compliance system in many regional areas. 
(Disney et al. 2010:75)
The protections that are in place to ensure that 
unemployed people are not subject to harsh or 
unreasonable penalties rely on the effective operation of 
communications, assessment and treatment services in 
the places where they live. The lack of these services in 
many remote areas appears likely to be contributing to 
higher penalty rates through imposition of unreasonable 
requirements on people who have significant 
nonvocational barriers, and the failure of measures 
designed to prevent harsh penalties applying to the 
most vulnerable.
Different individual and local responses to 
program requirements and penalties
Noncompliance with program requirements may 
reflect difficulties faced by individuals in meeting the 
requirements, but there is also evidence that some 
people more actively reject or resist the rules imposed on 
them. In response to a recent survey conducted by one of 
us for the two peak bodies that represent RJCP providers 
(National Employment Services Association and Jobs 
Australia), many providers reported that the latest reforms 
to RJCP were not only generating increased penalties, 
but also increasing the numbers of RJCP jobseekers 
leaving income support without a job, or leaving the 
region to avoid RJCP obligations (see Fig. 6).
FIG. 6 .  Impact of RJCP reforms, from RJCP provider survey 
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The withdrawal of people from income support has also 
been noted in media reports during 2013–15 (e.g. Wild 
2013, Betts 2015, Rothwell 2015, Wahlquist 2015). In 
2012, the then Northern Territory Coordinator-General for 
Remote Services identified significant disengagement 
from income support in that jurisdiction, noting that:
According to the Census a large and increasing 
part of the Aboriginal population do not regard 
themselves as part of the labour force, particularly 
young men between 15 and 24 years of age. 
(Havnen 2012:176) 
As Havnen suggested, further research is needed to 
uncover the level of, and reasons for, disengagement by 
these people. Although poverty is a major problem for 
people in remote communities and has serious long-term 
effects, it does not follow that remote Indigenous people 
will necessarily respond to the threat of financial penalties 
by complying with program requirements. The practice of 
sharing food and cash within family and kinship networks 
may shield individuals from the full effects of financial 
penalties. In these cases, although an individual may not 
experience the full impact of loss of income, the effect 
will be felt across their family and local community. In 
some areas, customary or informal economic activity 
may be used to supplement or substitute for income 
support – at least for a period. On the other side of 
the equation, the rewards from participation in labour 
market programs are not always clear in communities 
with limited job prospects. In the period from 1 July 2013 
to 31 December 2015, 6436 participants were recorded 
as having achieved 13 weeks of employment through 
RJCP/CDP.22 However, from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2015, 
6721 serious (eight-week) penalties were imposed on 
participants. Jobseekers in remote areas were more likely 
to receive a serious penalty than to secure employment 
that lasted for at least 13 weeks. On this basis, it is 
understandable that jobseekers in remote areas might 
question the value of participation. 
Those who are eligible to participate, but are not 
participating, in the income support system tend to be 
overlooked by policymakers when considering the design 
and effectiveness of labour market programs. But, if it is 
true that they are present in significant numbers in remote 
areas, that they are often young men and that their 
numbers are increasing, this could be expected to have 
long-term effects – for example, in increasing rates of 
crime, hunger, itinerancy and long-term disengagement 
from the workforce. 
Implications of 1 July 2015 changes
From 1 July 2015, RJCP was substantially changed and 
renamed CDP. From this date, activity-tested income 
support recipients aged 18–49 have been expected to 
participate in 25 hours of Work for the Dole activities, 
spread over five days per week, 12 months per year (with 
some provisions for allowable leave). For most, this has 
meant an increase in both the number of hours worked 
each week and the number of days of attendance, on 
top of what were already more onerous mutual obligation 
requirements than those applying in nonremote parts of 
the country. 
These changes to requirements were accompanied 
by a substantial shift in contracting arrangements with 
providers. Provider payments have been directly linked 
to recorded hours of attendance in Work for the Dole.23 
Where clients fail to attend without a reasonable excuse, 
a provider will only retain their payment for that period 
where they report noncompliance to DHS and are able 
to re-engage the person in Work for the Dole within two 
weeks. While providers have retained some discretion 
to allow absences or to identify people as not able to 
participate in Work for the Dole (e.g. because of mental 
illness or other health issues), in each case this will lead 
to reduced fees. Referral to other services – such as 
rehabilitation or counselling – is allowed, but, if provider 
payments are to be maintained, attendance at these 
other services must be monitored daily and must meet 
the hours requirement. This is likely to be difficult in areas 
with limited community services. 
Alongside these new payment arrangements, a new 
Programme Management Framework has been 
introduced, which includes the following as one of its 
performance targets:
All Eligible Job Seeker non-attendance is handled 
swiftly and appropriately in accordance with 
Guidelines and the Funding Agreement. This 
includes:
• 100% of Eligible Job Seeker non-attendance is 
followed-up with the Eligible Job Seeker and actioned 
in the IT system on the same day.
• If no Valid Reason or Reasonable Excuse for Eligible 
Job Seeker non-attendance exists, 100% of Provider 
Attendance Reports and Non-Attendance Reports are 
submitted to DHS within 2 business days of non-
attendance by Eligible Job Seeker. (DPM&C 2015b)
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While the rules still suggest that providers can choose 
strategies other than compliance to re-engage 
jobseekers, both their performance ratings and financial 
outcomes will be reduced as a result (DPM&C 2015bc). 
Cumulatively, these changes have increased further 
the opportunity for people to fail to comply, increased 
pressure on providers to report nonattendance, and 
increased the disparity between the requirements of 
jobseekers in remote areas and jobseekers elsewhere. 
As the new CDP rules are implemented, there will almost 
certainly be increases in financial penalties applied in 
some of the poorest communities in the country.
One other development must be noted here. On 
2 December 2015, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs 
tabled a Bill in the Senate that would, if passed, enable 
him to remove remote areas from those provisions 
of social security legislation that set out obligations, 
penalties and protections for jobseekers, and to create 
new rules (set out in Regulations) in their place.24 The 
proposed legislation would also enable the government 
to move some of the decisions currently made by DHS 
in relation to income support payments across to CDP 
providers. Analysis of the intent and likely impact of that 
Bill is beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
The legislative framework under which income support 
is administered in remote Australia is (at least for 
now) the same as that in the remainder of the country, 
but available data from the first two years of RJCP 
suggest that the outcomes for beneficiaries have been 
quite different. More onerous program requirements 
– particularly in relation to mandatory Work for the 
Dole–type activities – have generated significantly 
higher levels of smaller penalties, and these in turn 
have contributed to higher application of eight-week 
penalties for persistent noncompliance. The systems 
that should protect vulnerable people from unreasonable 
requirements rely on the adequacy of DHS assessments, 
and on the availability of services in remote locations to 
identify and document individual capacity limitations. 
A shortage of these services means that at, each stage 
of the process – from the setting of requirements, to 
assessment of vulnerabilities, to investigation of reasons 
for noncompliance – RJCP clients seem to be at a 
disadvantage. In some cases, people are leaving the 
income support system altogether, placing them beyond 
the reach of employment assistance, and increasing 
financial pressure on families and communities. As the 
compliance effects of the new CDP start to emerge, the 
question arises as to whether an appropriate balance 
has been struck between the assistance afforded remote 
unemployed people and the effects of financial penalties 
on them and their families. 
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Notes
1. Currently, those with participation requirements are recipients 
of Newstart, Youth Allowance (Other), Parenting Payment 
(with a youngest child of 6 years or older), Disability Support 
Pension recipients (under 35 with compulsory requirements) 
and Special Benefit (subject to an activity test).
2. Senate Public Affairs and Finance Legislation Committee, 
Supplementary Budget Estimates, 19–23 October 2015, 
answers to questions on notice, question reference no. 143.
3. Forrest 2014:150, figures at December 2013. The most 
recent data suggest that CDP clients represent around 
3.8% of the national employment program case load, but 
the authors note a recent departmental estimate of 5% of 
national case load.
4. DPM&C submission to the Senate Inquiry into Social 
Security Legislation Amendment (Community Development 
Program) Bill 2015:10–11.
5. Reconnection penalties apply where a jobseeker has 
failed to attend an appointment, has had a reconnection 
appointment scheduled, and then fails to attend that 
appointment without a reasonable excuse.
6. At the time of writing, this was the full extent of published 
compliance reports. With 30 June 2015 marking the end of 
JSA and the end of the first iteration of RJCP, this is a logical 
end point for this analysis.
7. Widely known as Centrelink. Centrelink became part of DHS 
in 2011.
8. No Show No Pay penalties may also be applied in other 
circumstances – for example, for failing to attend a job 
interview. However, these other categories account for less 
than 2% of penalties overall, and less than 1% in RJCP, so 
have been disregarded here for greater simplicity.
9. ‘Employment Pathway Plan’ is the term used in social 
security legislation. However, these agreements were known 
as Individual Participation Plans in RJCP, and are now 
known as Job Plans.
10. For the penalty to be applied, the provider needed to report 
the nonattendance to DHS, which then had to determine 
that the conditions for the sanction applied.
11. The letting of the new jobactive contracts – which took 
effect from 1 July 2015 – meant that providers changed 
in many locations, and that both providers and DHS were 
engaged in the process of moving jobseekers across to the 
new program.
12.  Eight-week penalties may be waived in cases of financial 
hardship, but this is relatively rare. In the year to 30 June 
2015, only 238 waivers were granted (1%). The client may 
also ‘work off’ their penalty by working an additional 
25 hours per week for eight weeks. During the past year, 
77% of serious penalties were worked off, although figures 
for RJCP clients – who already had a higher weekly work 
requirement – were not available. It is unclear how the new 
25-hour-per-week requirement will affect the ability to work 
off eight-week penalties.
13.  The exception was early school leavers aged 22 years 
or less.
14.  It appears that relatively few JSA jobseekers have been 
referred to group activities with this mandatory hours 
requirement. Most have been referred to training, voluntary 
work, part-time work or some other form of activity 
(OECD 2012:106). The scope to do this was in RJCP, 
but the emphasis, particularly following the September 
2013 election of the Coalition government, has been on 
structured activities.
15.  Senate Public Affairs and Finance Legislation Committee, 
Supplementary Budget Estimates, 19–23 October 2015, 
answers to questions on notice, question reference no. 152.
16.  Senate Public Affairs and Finance Legislation Committee, 
Supplementary Budget Estimates, 19–23 October 2015, 
answers to questions on notice, question reference no. 152. 
‘Unreasonable’ here includes unreasonable commute 
(4.3%), unreasonable requirement (4%) and inappropriate 
referral (1.6%).
17.  Refer to Section 1.1.E.104 of the Guide to social security law 
(DSS 2015). In JSA or jobactive, this may include referring to 
an assistance stream with a stronger focus on nonvocational 
assistance or to Disability Employment Services. A Job 
Capacity Assessment may also be conducted to consider 
the impact of health or disabilities on eligibility for the 
Disability Support Pension (Section 1.1.J.10 of the Guide to 
social security law).
18.  See, for example, guidance to clients referred to 
assessments at www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/
enablers/employment-services-assessments-and-job-
capacity-assessments.
19.  Senate Public Affairs and Finance Legislation Committee, 
Supplementary Budget Estimates, 19–23 October 2015, 
answers to questions on notice, question reference no. 146.
20.  Senate Public Affairs and Finance Legislation Committee, 
Supplementary Budget Estimates, 19–23 October 2015, 
answers to questions on notice, question reference no. 147.
21.  See http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-
law/3/1/13/70.
22.  DPM&C, additional information provided to the Senate 
Public Affairs and Finance Legislation Committee Senate 
Inquiry into Social Security Legislation Amendment 
(Community Development Program) Bill 2015, 26 
February 2016.
23.  There was an initial transition period up to 31 December 
2015 when providers were guaranteed income based on a 
75% Work for the Dole attendance rate.
24.  Social Security Legislation Amendment (Community 
Development Program) Bill 2015.
caepr.anu.edu.au
Working Paper No. 108/2016  13 
Appendix A RJCP regions
FIG. A1. Map of the 60 RJCP regions
RJCP = Remote Jobs and Communities Program
Christmas–Cocos islands
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